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Abstract
There is a strong philosophical intuition that direct study of the brain can and will constrain the development
of psychological theory. When this intuition is tested against case studies from the psychology of perception
and memory, it turns out that psychology has led the way toward knowledge of neurophysiology. An abstract
argument is developed to show that psychology can and must lead the way in neuroscientific study of mental
function. The counterintuition is based on mainly weak arguments about the fundamentality or objectivity of
physics or physiology in relation to psychology.
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          1. Introduction.  Philosophers have long speculated about the strong
          constraints that brain science will or should provide for any future possible
          psychological theories.  Hempel (1949) advocated replacing psychological
          language with physical language, which would be used to describe both behavior
          and brain states.  Quine (1974) maintained that mentalistic talk could be
          tolerated in psychology only provisionally, as a means toward a full
          physiological or physical explanation of behavior.  P. S. Churchland (1986)
          foresaw the replacement of "folk psychology" with neuroscientific
          descriptions.  On the other side, Fodor (1974) has long plumped for the
          autonomy of psychology from neuroscience, by analogy with the (alleged)
          hardware-independence of computer programs.
               These predictions of elimination or strong constraint were undertaken in
          virtually complete innocence of actual cases of interaction between scientific
          psychology and neurophysiology.  Quine’s discussions were simply so many
          promissory notes about the future course of science (Quine 1974, 33-34).
          Churchland’s _N_e_u_r_o_p_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y did not address genuine interactions between
          psychology and neuroscience, because the representative of [S389] psychology
          in that book was (philosophers’) folk psychology, not the actual results
          experimental psychology (see Corballis 1988, Hatfield 1988a).  Further,
          Fodor’s case for autonomy relied heavily on the computer metaphor (Fodor,
          1975, chaps. 1-2), which turned out not to be the only game in town, and in
          _________________________
          *Published in _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y _o_f _S_c_i_e_n_c_e 67 (Proceedings, 2000), pp. S388-S403.
          The page numbers of the published version are shown in brackets in the body
          of the text of this report.
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          any event he dismissed (1975, 17) the importance of physiology for psychology
          without engaging the living body of work in physiological psychology.
               Contemporary philosophy of science seeks to understand the cognitive
          features of living science.  Without aiming to be merely descriptive, it seeks
          to capture conceptual relations and explanatory structures that have a basis
          in actual scientific practice.  In this article I appeal to real cases in
          support of the argument that, typically, psychological theory has led the way
          toward neuroscientific understanding.  Section 2 surveys some major results in
          sensory psychology.  Section 3 examines the strongest alleged case for the
          neuroscientific revision of fundamental psychological theory, the neurological
          finding of selectively preserved memory in amnesiacs.  In section 4, I offer a
          simple and straightforward conceptual argument that psychology must lead the
          way toward a neuroscientific understanding of mental function and the brain’s
          role therein.  These reflections and arguments raise the question of how it
          could have seemed so obvious to some philosophers that neuroscience must
          strongly condition or even replace psychology.  Section 5 examines this
          question and asks what it means to say instead that psychology conditions
          neuroscience.
          2. Sensory Physiology: Psychology Leads and Constrains Neurophysiology.
          Sensory physiology is an area of rich interaction between neuroscience and
          psychology, and one in which knowledge is well advanced in both domains.  I
          consider the relation between psychology and neurophysiology in three
          historical cases that span the modern period.  The earliest case serves as a
          reminder that a basic functional parsing of the body and nervous system is
          itself a fundamental achievement, and is by no means obvious.  The three cases
          are binocular single vision, stereopsis, and opponent processes in color
          vision.
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               _2._1. _N_e_w_t_o_n _a_n_d _B_i_n_o_c_u_l_a_r _S_i_n_g_l_e _V_i_s_i_o_n.  We have two eyes with
          overlapping fields of vision, which receive separate impressions from objects
          in the area of overlap, and yet we usually see such objects singly.  Since
          antiquity, these facts have led visual theorists to speculate about how single
          vision is achieved (Wade 1987).  Early theorists, including Galen (discussed
          in Siegel 1970, 59-62), Alhazen (Ibn al-Haytham), and Witelo (discussed in
          Hatfield and Epstein 1979), proposed a physiological unification of binocular
          stimulation in the optic chiasma (where the two optic nerves meet).  But since
          the optic nerves separate at the chiasma and continue on [S390] to separate
          sides of the brain, a question remained about how the post-chiasmally separate
          optic nerves mediate single vision (see, e.g., the figure in Discourse 5 of
          Descartes’ _D_i_o_p_t_r_i_c, [1637] 1958, 149).
               Various early modern solutions were proposed, including Descartes’
          unification of binocular stimulation at the pineal gland (Descartes [1664]
          1985, 105).  In the Queries to his _O_p_t_i_c_s, Newton (1704) speculatively
          advanced the anatomical scheme that in fact underlies single vision.  He
          proposed that nerve fibers from the two eyes "partially decussate"--that is,
          partially cross--in the optic chiasma, so that fibers from each hemifield of
          the retina join in the chiasma and proceed to their respective side of the
          brain in a manner that preserves retinotopic order.  His reasoning was based
          on some erroneous comparative anatomy (he mistakenly believed that fish and
          chamelia lack a chiasma), but his functional conjecture was sound and was
          confirmed by observations on brain damaged patients during the eighteenth
          century (Finger 1994, 83).  One of the foremost findings in sensory physiology
          in the mid twentieth century was the discovery, using single cell recording
          techniques in cats and primates, of neurons in the visual cortex that are
          activated only by input from both eyes (Barlow, Blakemore, and Pettigrew 1967,
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          Poggio and Fischer 1977).  Further, neurons receiving stimulation from one or
          both eyes are laid out retinotopically across the back of the brain (Barlow
          1990).  So Newton’s anatomical conjecture is largely confirmed (although the
          neurons from each eye actually unite only cortically, and merely cross and
          become contiguous in the chiasma).  Since only rudimentary anatomical
          knowledge of the brain was available in his time, with no techniques for
          examining neural microstructure, it is clear that Newton’s understanding of
          the psychological function of single vision led the way to his neuroanatomical
          hypothesis.
               _2._2. _S_t_e_r_e_o_p_s_i_s.  Our two eyes fixate the same objects from slightly
          different perspectives, which means that they each receive slightly different
          images of those objects.  The disparities between the two images serve as a
          powerful source of information for the relative depth of the parts of objects
          or among objects.  (Convergence, or the angles formed by the optical axes,
          serves as an independent source of information for absolute depth, via the
          geometry of angle-side-angle.)  In the decades following the discovery of the
          stereoscope by Charles Wheatstone in the 1830s, P. L. Panum, A. W. Volkmann,
          W. Wundt, H. Helmholtz, and E. Hering, among others, investigated the
          psychophysics of the depth response (see Turner 1994, 13-26).  They studied
          many features of the depth response, including acuity for disparity, the
          temporal course of the response, and the efficacy of crossed vs. uncrossed
          disparities (image elements reversed between the two eyes, or not).  Although
          virtually nothing was known of the microphysiology of the brain, [S391] these
          investigators framed various speculative hypotheses about the anatomical and
          physiological basis of stereopsis.
               When binocularly driven neurons were discovered in the 1960s, some of
          them showed sensitivity to varying degrees of disparity.  Investigators
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          immediately conjectured that these "disparity detectors" serve the binocular
          depth response (Barlow et al. 1967).  In this case, a newly discovered
          anatomical structure and its physiological activity were interpreted in
          relation to a visual capacity whose properties had been discovered through
          psychophysical and psychological investigation alone.  The precise
          psychological mechanism by which the detection of local retinal disparities
          produces a depth response remains unknown.  But subsequent investigation has
          shown a deep interaction among neurophysiological work, computational
          simulation, and psychophysical studies.  Bishop and Pettigrew, leaders in the
          neurophysiological and psychological study of stereopsis, conclude in their
          1986 review of the field that individual neurophysiological results continue
          to be interpreted largely on the basis of psychophysical findings.
               In a 1992 review, Tychsen found work on stereopsis had recently undergone
          a conceptual shift which he related to the neuroanatomical division of visual
          neurophysiology into parvocellular and magnocellular pathways.  The pathways
          are named for types of cells found in layers in the lateral geniculate
          nucleus, which then project cortically.  Parvocellular neurons are slow but
          finely tuned, magnocellular are fast and coarsely tuned.  Tyler (1990) applied
          these findings to binocular vision, distinguishing a fine, slow, global,
          foveal system that is good for static targets from a coarse, fast, local,
          wide-scope system, with greater sensitivity to moving targets.  Although Tyler
          acknowledged that neuroanatomical studies provided "the inspiration for the
          psychophysical partition of sensory processing into categories of specialized
          analysis" (Tyler 1990, 1877), he also noted that he himself had previously
          (Tyler 1983) postulated similar multiple systems of stereopsis "on the basis
          of psychophysical evidence alone."  In now linking psychological theories of
          stereopsis with neurophysiological findings, he hoped to facilitate testing
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          "of proposed associations between the separable processes in the two domains"
          (Tyler 1990, 1894).  Here there is linkage between neuroscience and
          psychology, but no precedence of brain facts over psychological facts.
          Indeed, the psychological facts about stereopsis again led the way.
               _2._3.  _C_o_l_o_r _v_i_s_i_o_n _a_n_d _o_p_p_o_n_e_n_t _p_a_t_h_w_a_y_s.  The golden age of visual
          science in the latter nineteenth century saw two competing accounts of color
          vision (Turner 1994, chaps. 6-7).  Helmholtz revived and extended Thomas
          Young’s proposal that there are only three types of color sensitive element in
          the retina, each responding maximally to a particular wavelength [S392]
          (Helmholtz [1867] 1925, 2:134-46).  Perceived color then results from the
          combination of stimulation from the three types of element.  In opposition to
          this simple trichromatic model of color vision, Hering argued that color
          vision results from three opponent processes in the central nervous system,
          one serving red-green perception, one blue-yellow, and one black-white (Hering
          1875; Turner 1994, 130-4).  Neither of these arguments was based on knowledge
          of retinal anatomy and microphysiology.  Indeed, the photic properties of the
          cones, which are the retinal element subserving daytime color vision, were
          directly measured only in the latter twentieth century (Kaiser and Boynton
          1996, chap. 5).  Helmholtz’s arguments were based on color matching
          experiments (on both normal and color deficient observers), in which lights of
          known spectral composition are adjusted until they look the same.  Hering’s
          arguments were based on similar types of measurements, and on phenomenological
          observations.  On phenomenal grounds, Hering contended that there are four
          color primaries: red, yellow, blue, and green.  He argued that afterimages
          reveal adaptation effects among the four primaries, thereby revealing linkage
          in the underlying physiology: yellow produces a blue afterimage, red a green
          one, and so on.  He also observed that color deficient individuals are always
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          "red and green blind" (or "blue and yellow blind"), but are never simply "red
          blind" or "green blind."  On these grounds he speculatively postulated yoked
          physiological process underlying red-green and blue-yellow perception, which
          operate in opponent fashion, so that a red sensation arises when the red-green
          channel is driven one direction, and a green sensation when it is driven in
          the opposite, or opponent, direction.  In the 1950s Leo Hurvich and Dorothea
          Jameson revived the opponent process theory, arguing from psychophysical data
          obtained in certain kinds of color mixture experiments (cancellation
          experiments, reviewed in Hurvich 1981, chaps. 5-6).  Subsequently, opponent
          neural mechanisms were discovered in the retina, lateral geniculate nucleus,
          and other brain loci.  The theory that the three types of cone in normal human
          eyes are linked neurophysiologically into opponent processes is now widely
          accepted (Kaiser and Boynton 1996, chap. 7).
               In the three cases reviewed, psychophysics and phenomenology led the way
          to the postulation and subsequent confirmation of neural mechanisms.  Which is
          not to say that researchers do not work the other way around, using specific
          neurophysiological findings to generate new research questions.  Ken Nakamura
          (1990) contended that findings about brain anatomy called for some new
          psychological theorizing.  Neurophysiologists had found that a larger portion
          of cerebral cortex is devoted to vision than had been thought, and that the
          areas are highly subdivided.  He described this as a case in which, for once,
          "it is the physiologists who seem to be leading the way, at least as far as
          higher visual functions are [S393] concerned."  In order to redress "this
          imbalance between psychology and neurophysiology," he offered a "speculative
          theory as to the overall functional organization of the visual system"
          (Nakamura 1990, 411). Physiology had shown the existence of apparently
          specialized areas, and psychology would now propose a functional organization
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          for them, drawing on work from cognitive psychology, psychophysics,
          physiology, and artificial intelligence.  Peter Kaiser and Robert Boynton,
          co-authors of the standard handbook on human color vision, allow that in work
          on color vision findings from anatomy, neurophysiology, and photochemistry
          have sometimes inspired new psychophysical experiments, but they maintain that
          "the data of the psychophysicist, together with theories developed from such
          data, provide a framework within which the electrophysiologist conducts his
          research" (Kaiser and Boynton 1996, 26-27).  Which suggests that while
          physiological facts and theories may inspire or confirm research and theory
          cast in psychological language, psychological language remains the primary
          vocabulary for describing the functions being investigated, including those
          investigated in neurophysiological research.
          3. The Neuropsychology of Memory: H.M. Revisited.  Standing in contrast to the
          finding of section 2, Patricia Churchland (1986, 1996) has claimed that in
          some areas of work neurological results have led the way to a radical
          rethinking of basic theoretical categories in psychology.  She makes the
          boldest claim for work in memory, declaring that "some data discovered by
          neuropsychologists are so remarkable, and so contrary to common assumptions,
          that they suggest that some basic assumptions about memory may be in need of
          radical revision" (Churchland 1986, 150).  What are these basic assumptions?
          Are they merely the assumptions of "folk psychology," or does she mean the
          assumptions of scientific (experimental) psychology?  Although "folk
          psychology" is her usual target, Churchland here addresses experimental
          psychology directly.  She asserts that psychological theory on topics such as
          memory is in a "_s_t_a_t_u _n_a_s_c_e_n_d_i," its current level of development being
          "pretheoretical" (1986, 149, 153).  But she found cause for hope.  Studies of
          amnesiac patients led some neuropsychologists "to postulate two memory
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          systems, each with its own physiological basis" (1986, 371).  The two systems
          in question are the _d_e_s_c_r_i_p_t_i_v_e and _p_r_o_c_e_d_u_r_a_l memories of Squire and Cohen
          1984.  As Churchland (1986, 372) tells it, their observations on amnesiac
          patients led them to posit distinct memory subsystems of a sort unlike those
          on offer from psychologists who study memory in the intact human.
               The issue in question is not whether neurological observations are
          germane to psychological research on memory, but whether in this case
          neurological observation led to the introduction of new theoretical
          categories, and specifically, to the introduction of a novel distinction
          between descriptive [S394] and procedural memory systems.  As it turns out, in
          Squire and Cohen’s case (Cohen and Squire 1980, Squire and Cohen 1984, Cohen
          1984) the theoretical framework they adopted was drawn from previous work
          [S395] in experimental psychology, cognitive science, and philosophy, as were
          the motivation for the empirical questions they asked and the experimental
          procedures they adopted.
               The relevant part of Squire and Cohen’s work concerned preserved learning
          and memory capacities in amnesiacs.  The "preserved" capacities are those
          unaffected or only partially affected by the cause of the amnesia.  It was
          well-known that amnesiacs who suffer severe memory deficits may suffer no
          effects on perceptual-motor learning and memory (Milner, Corkin and Teubner
          1968).  Squire and Cohen asked whether other sorts of skills are preserved.
          In Cohen and Squire 1980 they showed that amnesiac patients could perform well
          on a pattern-analyzing skill, which involved reading mirror-reversed words.
          Although the patients could not remember previous trials, even from day to
          day, their performance showed dramatic improvement over three consecutive days
          of testing and in a retest three months later.  Cohen and Squire (1980)
          interpreted their results in relation to proposals made by Kolers (1975) and
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          by Winograd (1972).  Kolers (1975) used psychological experiments to study
          memory in intact adult humans.  He interpreted his findings on sentence-
          recognition tasks (including tasks with geometrically reversed stimuli) by
          distinguishing between "operational or procedural" and "semantic or
          substantive" memory.  Kolers drew this distinction from a discussion of
          "knowing how" vs. "knowing that" in a book on the philosophy of education by
          Israel Scheffler (1965), who in turn drew upon Gilbert Ryle’s (1949) analysis
          of intelligent behavior.  Winograd (1975) characterized the distinction
          between "knowing how" and "knowing that" as dividing procedural (programmed)
          from declarative (data base) knowledge.  In a subsequent review and expansion
          of their results, Squire and Cohen (1984, 37) articulated their distinction,
          drawing directly on Ryle (1949), on work in psychology (Bruner 1969), and on
          artificial intelligence (including Winograd 1975).  Finally, Cohen (1984)
          retested the much-studied amnesiac H.M. on a cognitive skill that had been
          well-studied by experimental psychologists, the "Tower of Hanoi" problem, and
          he further articulated the procedural-declarative distinction, again drawing
          on Ryle, Bruner, Kolers, Winograd, and other work in artificial intelligence.
               In this case, the methods of testing, the framework for posing empirical
          questions, and the theoretical concepts used are drawn from previous work at a
          psychological or philosophical level of analysis.  Moreover, Squire and Cohen
          (1984, 4) did not present their work as requiring revision of basic ideas
          about memory, but as a challenge to previous views on amnesia as a unitary
          phenomenon (an assumption they attributed to previous work in neurology).
          They presented themselves as developing and extending theoretical conceptions
          of memory and skilled performance extant in the psychological and
          philosophical literatures.  Tests on various clinical populations provided a
          source of data about ways in which the normal functioning of human memory
                                              - 11 -
          could be disrupted.  Here, neurological results did not result in a
          fundamental rethinking of the basic categories of psychological theory, but in
          a refinement of those categories and an ability to relate them to brain loci
          known to be damaged in the amnesiac patients.  This is "co-evolution" of
          psychology and neuroscience as Churchland (1986) would have it, but with a
          genuine theoretical contribution coming from extant theoretical psychology, a
          contribution that Churchland missed in her portrayal of psychology as in a
          "pretheoretical" state on these issues.
               This case study does not show that reflection on neurological results, or
          on images or other recordings of brain activity, could not challenge the
          fundamental categories of psychological theory.  Nonetheless, the image of
          neuroscience as arriving at its results independently of previous
          psychological theory invokes a naive Baconianism that is implausible.
          Experimental findings of the sort achieved by Squire and Cohen require posing
          questions to nature.  This is true even if nature (or surgical procedures)
          have provided a "natural experiment" through a brain lesion.  Subjects’
          performances are evaluated through systematic tests, not casual observation.
          Systematic experimental procedures are devised against a background of
          previous theory and previous experimental paradigms.  Even casual observations
          are interpreted against a background of theory.  In the case of psychological
          capacities such as learning and memory, it is natural to suppose that
          psychological theory will provide the background.
               Again, this is not to say that neurological observation and
          neurophysiological measurement have not and will not continue to contribute to
          the advance of psychological theory.  Indeed, subsequent work in memory has
          seen continuing interaction between psychological and neuroscientific
          research.  The theoretical discussion has advanced to include alternatives to
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          the "memory systems" approach favored by Squire (1987) and by experimental
          psychologists such as Tulving (1983).  The alternative theory proposes that
          data from brain damaged patients do not entail separate memory systems
          (despite the finding of a "double dissociation," which is often taken to imply
          distinct systems), because the data are also consistent with the hypothesis
          that various processing stages have been disrupted (Roediger, Srinivas, and
          Weldon 1989).  Data from animal studies, clinical observations, and
          experiments on normal children and adults are all used in testing theories
          about the psychology of memory and its neurophysiological substrate (see,
          e.g., Foster and Jelicic 1999).  Neuroscience has not provided an independent
          source of theory, but an additional source of [S396] data about function and
          about brain localization.  That is a real contribution.  But, as we shall see
          in section 4, it is unclear that neuroscientific data provide any firmer
          constraint on psychological theory than do other kinds of data.
          4. The Brain as a Mental Organ.  Review of some central cases from
          psychological science and neuroscience shows that psychology has led the way
          in the study of the brain, at least so far.  At the same time, bottom up
          studies of nervous systems and brains have been revolutionized during the
          twentieth century, as a result of new staining, recording, and scanning
          techniques.  The neuron doctrine, the discovery and classification of neural
          transmitters, and the advent of brain imagery stand as real and independent
          contributions of neuroscience.
               Given the rapid advances in brain science during the twentieth century,
          one might conjecture that the leading role played by psychology in my case
          studies was the product of the different growth rates of psychological and
          specifically neuroscientific knowledge.  Knowledge of the microstructure of
          brain tissue and measurement of neural activity required the development of
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          microscopic techniques and technology for recording and, subsequently, imaging
          brain activity.  The technology that made these results possible is less than
          a century old, and the more sophisticated techniques have arisen only in the
          past two decades.  By contrast, psychology, at least at the beginning, could
          operate with less equipment.  It could get started taxonomizing psychological
          function on the basis of data available through observation of everyday
          experience or behavior.  One might think that its descriptions served well in
          an instrumentally simpler day, before the advent of techniques that made
          possible a direct assault on the brain.  But in these auspicious times one
          might expect, with Quine and Churchland, that as science advances psychology
          will whither and neuroscientific concepts will replace its mentalistic
          descriptions.
               While granting the great advances in the direct study of the brain’s
          properties, I reject this line of reasoning.  I think an argument is available
          to show that psychology must provide the functional vocabulary for describing
          much of the brain’s activity.  To understand the brain we must come to
          understand not only its microanatomy and microphysiology, but its global
          functioning.  Some of its global functions serve to control vegetative
          functions, such as breathing or digestion.  But the brain is most famous for
          its role in realizing mental functions, including sense perception, memory,
          emotions, and higher cognitive abilities.  The description of these functions
          is mentalistic.  This mentalism does not restrict itself to a statically
          traditional vocabulary--the "folk psychology" of neurophilosophical lore--but
          it avails itself of the developing technical vocabulary of psychological
          science.  For example, as sensory psychology progressed, [S397] the
          traditional "sense of touch" was partitioned into numerous sensory systems
          (for haptic form, pressure, temperature, and more), thereby overturning the
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          tradition of the "five senses" (Scheerer 1995, 825, 851-856).  In this case, a
          traditional classification was overturned as psychology advanced.  Still, as
          sensory psychology has developed into a mature science its language has
          remained mentalistic, including talk of information, representation,
          experienced qualities, perceived intensities, and so forth.  Similarly, the
          language of attention research, while it has grown more precise, shows
          continuity with centuries of reflection on the phenomena of attention,
          mentalistically described (Hatfield 1998).  The mentalistic language of
          psychology should not be equated with outdated tradition.  It is a living
          vocabulary.  And it is the vocabulary for describing global brain function.
          The brain is a mental organ.
               These considerations provide the basis for a relatively straightforward
          argument to the effect that psychology must provide the primary theoretical
          vocabulary for describing many brain functions.  The argument goes as follows:
               (1) The operations of the brain can be partitioned into various
                    subsystems, study of which constitutes study of brain function.
               (2) Some of the functions realized by the brain are mental functions
                    (e.g., perception, attention, memory, emotions).
               (3) Psychology is the experimental science that directly studies mental
                    functions.
               (4) Hence psychology is the primary discipline covering a major subset of
                    brain functions.
               (5) Although it may be possible on occasion to reason from structure to
                    function, in general knowledge or conjecture about function guides
                    investigation of structure.
               (6) And so psychology leads the way in brain science.
               The premises have various bases, some tending toward the conceptual, some
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          hinting at the empirical.  But as in any conceptual argument about science,
          all of the premises have an empirical component.  (1) records the fact that
          the brain is a complex system with identifiable subsystems, the operations of
          which can be usefully studied in relative independence of the other
          subsystems.  (2) is a descriptive fact about the functions known to be
          realized by the brain.  While it may seem bald and contentious, it is
          supported by reflection on the practice of brain science.  Consult, for
          instance, the major and minor subdivisions of standard textbooks in
          neuroscience (e.g., Kandel, Schwartz & Jessell 1991).  Neuroscientists use a
          psychological taxonomy to describe brain systems.  They parse its operation
          into sensory, motivational, and motor systems (Kandel et al., Pt. IV, ch. 19),
          which are further subdivided into areas such as sensation and perception,
          [S398] motor and motivational processes, language, and thought (Pts. V-IX).
          (3) comes as close to a conceptual truth as any.  Psychology just is the
          science that studies mental functions in their own right.  The only way to
          "eliminate" psychology from any foreseeable neuroscience would be simply to
          declare that theories of mental brain functions will now be called
          neuroscientific rather than psychological.  (4) follows from (1)-(3).  (5) is
          supported by reflection on the history of biological science and by the cases
          reviewed in sections 2-3.  It records the fact that typically, knowledge or
          conjecture about function guides the investigation of structure.  Structure is
          hard to see in the absence of functional description.  (5) blocks the
          supposition that a neuroscience devoid of psychological content could
          frequently provide a "bottom up" route to discovering global brain function.
          (6) follows from (4) and (5).
               5. Constraint.  Suppose for the moment that this argument is correct.
          What implications does it have for the deeply held intuition that neuroscience
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          is more basic than, and strongly conditions, psychology?
               One could argue that psychology leads neuroscience only because of the
          epistemic limitations of the investigators.  Because we start from a position
          of ignorance, we need to move from function to structure.  But once we come to
          understand brain structure, we will see how it limits brain function.  This
          position is in fact intuitively plausible.  But to understand its import we
          should consider further the notion of constraint.
               How does knowledge of one science constrain another?  Once one
          understands chemistry, it becomes apparent that you cannot make water from
          carbon and nitrogen.  The constituents constrain what can be done, or made,
          with them.  Perhaps adequate knowledge of the brain would constrain psychology
          in the same way.
               This I think is the model of constraint implicit in the intuition that
          neuroscience must constrain psychology.  At a very general level, we can
          suppose that some constraint of this sort is known to us.  We perhaps can be
          said to know that the nervous system of an earthworm is incapable of
          supporting philosophical reflection.  Given the worm’s ganglia, we see that it
          is unable to do philosophy; there are not enough circuits to permit deep
          reflection.  (In fact our belief here is largely guided by knowledge of
          earthworm behavior in relation to its ganglia, but let us ignore this for the
          sake of argument.)  Beyond extreme and very general instances such as this, so
          little is known about how brains realize psychological states and processes
          that this sort of constraint from constituent structure has no consequences
          for practice, now or in the foreseeable future.
               A related intuition behind the idea that neuroscience constrains
          psychology is that physics is the basic science of what there is, and
          neuroscience is closer to physics than is psychology.  Because physics is
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          basic, it [S399] sets boundaries on what is possible.  As a practical matter,
          this argument falls prey to the observation that in the present state of
          knowledge we have little or no idea about how physical properties limit the
          psychological properties that material objects, and brains in particular, can
          realize.
               Still, the basicality of physics might be expressed through the notion of
          nomic asymmetry.  It may be asserted as self-evident that psychology cannot
          postulate processes that violate the laws of physics, whereas physics is
          unconstrained by psychology.  But in our present state of knowledge, this
          claim simply does not hold.  Consider an example.  Let us suppose that physics
          precludes psychology from positing processes in which information is
          transmitted from one location to another so that it arrives faster than the
          speed of light.  We have been conditioned to nod assent to this.  But should
          we treat this restriction as apodictic?  Is it inconceivable that a
          psychological finding could cause us to question this statement?  I think not.
          Conceive this.  Under tightly controlled conditions, someone on earth is able
          to repeat what someone on the moon is thinking, and to do so with a time
          difference less than the time required for light to travel from the moon to
          earth.  Teams of experts verify the empirical finding.  Billionaires get
          interested in the phenomenon, and they hire the best scientists, physicists
          included, to monitor the test.  It is concluded that the test is fair.  What
          shall we do now?  Posit the existence of extraphysical information
          transmission?  Or consider revising the speed-of-light limitation on physical
          transfers?  The latter option would seem to be open.  So in this case,
          psychological facts might call physical theories in question.  More generally,
          if facts are facts and truth is truth, it strikes me that physical facts, and
          true physical theories, cannot conflict with psychological facts and true
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          psychological theories any more than the latter can conflict with the former.
               The effective upshot of the basicality assumption is an abstract
          ontological asymmetry between physics and psychology.  You can have physical
          things with no psychological properties, but we believe that nothing with
          psychological properties can fail to be realized in matter.  You cannot have
          psychological properties in the absence of physical realization.  This
          abstract constraint is far removed from theorizing about the actual
          psychological capacities realized in the brain, and from determining their
          relations to brain structures.
               There are two additional, closely related intuitions that may help
          explain widespread assent to the notion that neuroscience is privileged over,
          and does or will control psychology.  The first is publicity: the brain is a
          physical object in the public domain.  But an important area of psychology,
          the psychology of perception, concerns private objects, in the form of sensory
          experiences.  So psychology is methodologically suspect.  "Objective"
          knowledge is only of what is public. [S400]
               This argument is interesting in the abstract, but it runs afoul of actual
          scientific achievement.  The first areas of psychology to be made objective,
          in the sense of achieving repeatable quantitative results, were sensory
          perception and psychophysics (Hearnshaw 1987, chap. 9).  A plausible
          description of the subject matter of psychophysics is that it charts the
          relations between physical stimuli and perceptual experience, as in the case
          of the trichromacy matching results achieved in the nineteenth century.  The
          right hand term of laws in psychophysics, then, is the content of a mental
          state, the content of perceptual experience (see Shapiro 1995).  So the much
          touted "privacy" of psychological states, whatever interest it might have, has
          not blocked the scientific study of such states.
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               The second intuition concerns an alleged contrast in empirical rigor
          between physics and psychology.  Allegedly, physics is hard and objective,
          psychology is soft and subjective.  According to Quine (1974, 36),
          psychological notions thrive in darkness, and they will dissipate when
          physics, or neuroscience, turns on the light.  This argument relies on an
          inaccurate portrayal of the achievements of psychology.  Typically, it relies
          on the construal of psychology as "folk psychology," that is, as a
          codification of (allegedly) ordinary ascriptions of beliefs and desires to
          explain behavior.  But, as suggested above, the mentalistic vocabulary of
          psychology is a living body of scientific description.  If it is to be
          challenged, it must be challenged on its own terms, and not, as often happens,
          by surreptitiously changing the subject so as to substitute so-called "folk
          psychology" for the corpus of scientific psychology.  (On this point see also
          Hatfield 1988b, Wilkes 1980.)
               Let us consider briefly some ways in which psychology conditions and
          constrains brain science.  Primarily, psychology provides the basic functional
          description of numerous brain systems.  This means that epistemically and
          methodologically psychology must lead the way in the study of global brain
          function.  Ontologically, psychology may be seen as providing another
          constraint on brain structure.  Brain structures presumably have evolved so as
          to realize advantageous psychological functions.  For example, trichromatic
          color system allow finer discrimination of objects by color than do
          dichromatic systems.  The neural structures underlying trichromacy presumably
          exist in populations because of the psychological function they perform
          (Thompson 1995, chap. 4).  If this is so, then the ontology of the brain is
          affected diachronically, through selection for advantageous psychological
          functions.  In this way, psychological function constrains brain ontology.
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          (See Hatfield in press for further discussion.)
          6. Conclusion.  Reflection on neuroscience and psychology suggests that
          psychology has and must condition and constrain neuroscience.  In the area of
          sensory perception, knowledge of psychological function has led [S401] the way
          in the individuation and investigation of visual neurophysiology.  In
          neuropsychological investigation of memory, psychological theories of memory
          provided the framework within which questions were posed in the study of
          deficits caused by brain damage.
               The idea that neuroscience can or should deeply constrain psychology is
          based on two sorts of arguments.  First, there are abstract arguments
          concerning publicity, mushiness, nomic asymmetry, and ontological asymmetry.
          The first three sorts of argument are unconvincing.  Ontological asymmetry
          provides a general constraint on solutions to the mind-body problem.  But it
          does not offer real guidance for contemporary psychology.
               The second sort of argument, from constituent structure, is based on the
          hope that future understanding of the brain will permit strong constraints to
          be "read off" descriptions of neural structure and activity.  At present,
          constraints of this sort are at best very general, such as that earthworms
          cannot do philosophy.  We can hope that knowledge of the brain’s properties
          will progress to the point where this sort of constraint from constituent
          elements becomes available.  One thing is for sure.  If brain science does
          develop to that extent, psychology will lead the way.
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